Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information

This paper examines the incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information where neither types nor actions of the agents are observable. The different contractual forms are compared. including short-term non-tenured contract and tenure contract with or without probationary period. It is shown that tenure track may help reduce information rent for the department in the situation where a smaller portion of high productive researchers are entitled to undertake very costly and time-consuming research project with a high potential value. However, when the probationary period cannot efficiently screen out the low productive researchers, providing both short-term non-tenured contract and tenure contract without probationary period or merely providing short-term non-tenured contract will be more likely taken by department. Therefore, the coexistence of different contractual forms in higher educational system, including the growing use of non-tenure track in some academic sectors can be economically explained. Crown Copyright (c) 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.