Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard

被引：38

作者：

Jensen, F ^{[1
]}

Vestergaard, N ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ So Denmark, Dept Environm & Business Econ, DK-6700 Esbjerg, Denmark

来源：

RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2002年 / 24卷 / 04期

关键词：

moral hazard; fisheries regulation; illegal behaviour;

D O I：

10.1016/S0928-7655(02)00003-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper treats illegal landings and discards of fish as a moral hazard problem that arises from individual catches that are unobservable to society, and hence are private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems of illegal landings and discards. The incentive scheme uses fish stock size as the tax variable, and can be seen as an alternative to a control policy. Rough estimates from a simulation study suggest that the incentive scheme is potentially useful. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：281 / 299

页数：19

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