Novel procedures to choose the management of PPPs

被引:0
|
作者
Frey, Bruno S. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Basel, Basel, Switzerland
[2] CREMA Ctr Res Econ Management & Arts, Suedstr 11, CH-8008 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
PPP enterprises; Directed Random Choice; Rotating CEOs; selection risk; diversity; burn-out; succession problem; DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP;
D O I
10.24294/jipd.v3i2.1149
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
There is a large literature on public-private-partnership, covering many different areas and aspects. This article deals with a specific but important aspect: the decision-making mechanisms to choose the management of PPP enterprises. In this sector, a suitable choice of managers is of particular importance because the persons chosen must balance the public and private interests. This is often difficult to achieve. Two new procedures are discussed, "Directed Random Choice" and "Rotating CEOs". In each case, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure of choosing the managers of PPP enterprises are discussed and evaluated. It is concluded that the two novel mechanisms should be seriously considered when choosing the managers of PPP enterprises.
引用
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页码:196 / 203
页数:8
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