Information aggregation in competitive markets

被引：7
|
作者：
Siga, Lucas [1 ]
Mihm, Maximilian [1 ]
机构：
[1] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Div Social Sci, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
来源：
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2021年 / 16卷 / 01期
关键词：
Auctions; betweenness; competitive markets; information aggregation; rational expectations equilibrium; C72; D44; D82; D83; G14; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; AUCTIONS; FAILURE;
D O I：
10.3982/TE3559
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information-the betweenness property-that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.
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页码：161 / 196
页数：36
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