We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in the presence of 'inventing around' (or 'non-infringing' imitation) and technology licensing. Though the 'tournament effect' under patent protection may reduce R&D investment, we show that the effect of either imitation or technology licensing may always dominate the tournament effect and create higher R&D investment under patent protection. The effect of higher R&D investment on welfare is ambiguous. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Pontifical Catholic Univ Rio de Janeiro, IAG Business Sch, Rio De Janeiro, BrazilPontifical Catholic Univ Rio de Janeiro, IAG Business Sch, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Paula, Fabio de Oliveira
da Silva, Jorge Ferreira
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Pontifical Catholic Univ Rio de Janeiro, IAG Business Sch, Rio De Janeiro, BrazilPontifical Catholic Univ Rio de Janeiro, IAG Business Sch, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
机构:
College of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, 50011-1350, IACollege of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, 50011-1350, IA
Gao L.
Yang L.L.
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School of Business Administration, University of Miami, Coral Gables, 33124-6531, FLCollege of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, 50011-1350, IA
Yang L.L.
Zhang J.H.
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机构:
Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis, Memphis, 38152-3120, TNCollege of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, 50011-1350, IA
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Univ Buenos Aires, Ctr Interdisciplinary Studies Ind & Econ Law, RA-1425 Buenos Aires, DF, ArgentinaUniv Buenos Aires, Ctr Interdisciplinary Studies Ind & Econ Law, RA-1425 Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina