Effort Decision in Cooperative R&D with Moral Hazard

被引:0
|
作者
Chang Tiantian [1 ]
Li Hua [1 ]
机构
[1] Lanzhou Jiaotong Univ, Sch Automat & Elect Engn, Lanzhou 730070, Peoples R China
关键词
Moral Hazard; Cooperative R&D; Principal Agent; Maximum Principle; TEAMS;
D O I
10.1109/CCDC.2009.5194857
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Cooperative research and development (R&D) is commonly adopted in recent supply chain (SC). The effort level decision of supplier under moral hazard is discussed in this paper and the objective is to find the optimal decision strategy of suppliers in cooperative R&D. Applying maximal principle, the optimal decision strategy has been obtained The results indicate that, due to moral hazard, the supplier makes more effort but suffers from less profits as the payment for the policy to incite the manufacturer. A numerical example is given to illustrate the strategy.
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页码:4776 / 4778
页数:3
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