Corporate governance structure and product market competition

被引：11
|
作者：
Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl [1 ]
Park, Kyung Suh [2 ]
机构：
[1] Korea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, KAIST Coll Business, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Korea Univ, Sch Business, Seoul, South Korea
来源：
APPLIED ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 48卷 / 14期
关键词：
Corporate governance structure; managerial ownership; private benefit of control; product market competition; ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS; AGENCY COSTS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; EQUITY PRICES; OLIGOPOLY; FIRM; COMPENSATION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I：
10.1080/00036846.2015.1096009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm's corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager's stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager's stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm's product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.
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页码：1281 / 1292
页数：12
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