How political conflicts distort bilateral trade: Firm-level evidence from China

被引:22
|
作者
Li, Yuhua [1 ]
Jian, Ze [2 ]
Tian, Wei [3 ]
Zhao, Laixun [4 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[2] Guangdong Univ Finance Econ, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Peking Univ, Sch Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
[4] Kobe Univ, Res Inst Econ & Business, Kobe, Hyogo 6578501, Japan
关键词
Political conflicts; State-owned enterprises; Goldstein score; Import boycott; Export Control;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2021.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine how political conflicts affect trade, using both the Goldstein score that scales all political conflicts daily worldwide and the firm-country-product level data of Chinese imports. We find that political conflicts reduce Chinese imports in general. Specifically, (i) the imports of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are most reduced, and the effects mostly fall on imports of intermediate goods while not so much on capital goods; (ii) foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) are less negatively affected, because most of their trade is processing, which is less negatively affected by political conflicts than ordinary trade. These results are obtained via mechanisms in the mode of trade (processing vs. ordinary), variations in broad economic categories (BEC) and import boycotts and export controls. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:233 / 249
页数:17
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