Labor Rights, Venture Capital, and Firm Performance

被引：11
|
作者：
Xing, Xuejing [1 ]
Howe, John S. [2 ,3 ]
Anderson, Randy I. [4 ]
Yan, Shan [5 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[2] Univ Missouri, Finance, Columbia, MO USA
[3] Univ Missouri, Trulaske Coll Business, Columbia, MO USA
[4] Griffin Capital Asset Management, El Segundo, CA USA
[5] Susquehanna Univ, Dept ofManagement, Finance, Selinsgrove, PA USA
来源：
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2017年 / 46卷 / 01期
关键词：
TO-WORK LAWS; CORPORATE; GOVERNANCE; UNIONS; UNIONIZATION; INNOVATION; OWNERSHIP; SUPPLIER; IMPACTS; BOARDS;
D O I：
10.1111/fima.12137
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We investigate the role of labor unions in the performance of venture capital (VC)-backed firms. Using a large sample of initial public offering firms from 1983 to 2013, we find that VC-backed firms in highly unionized industries have lower Tobin's Q and are less likely to survive. This effect is robust to endogeneity concerns and to controlling for industry and firm characteristics. The findings suggest that strong labor rights impede innovative firms' performance and survival, thereby adversely affecting innovation, economic growth, and employment.
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页码：129 / 154
页数：26
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