Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard when the Quantity and Quality of Children are Stochastic

被引：10
|
作者：
Cigno, Alessandro [1 ]
Luporini, Annalisa [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Florence, Dipartimento Studi Stato, I-50127 Florence, Italy
[2] Univ Florence, Dipartimento Sci Econ, I-50127 Florence, Italy
来源：
CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2011年 / 57卷 / 02期
关键词：
Stochastic quantity and quality of children; moral hazard; population externalities; family allowances; scholarships; pensions; PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM; ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY; TAXATION; DESIGN; SYSTEM; ALLOWANCES; SIZE;
D O I：
10.1093/cesifo/ifr007
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without taking into account the effects of these actions on the government's future tax revenue. The second-best policy provides parents with credit and insurance, and allows them to appropriate the external benefits of their actions. (JEL Codes: D13, D78, D82, H31, J13).
引用
收藏
页码：349 / 364
页数：16
相关论文
共 42 条
12345