机构:
World Bank, Financial & Private Sect Dev, Vice Presidency, Washington, DC 20433 USAWorld Bank, Financial & Private Sect Dev, Vice Presidency, Washington, DC 20433 USA
De Rosa, Donato
[1
]
Gooroochurn, Nishaal
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
London Metropolitan Univ, London, EnglandWorld Bank, Financial & Private Sect Dev, Vice Presidency, Washington, DC 20433 USA
Gooroochurn, Nishaal
[2
]
Goerg, Holger
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Kiel Inst World Econ, Kiel, Germany
Univ Kiel, Kiel, GermanyWorld Bank, Financial & Private Sect Dev, Vice Presidency, Washington, DC 20433 USA
Goerg, Holger
[3
,4
]
机构:
[1] World Bank, Financial & Private Sect Dev, Vice Presidency, Washington, DC 20433 USA
Corruption;
productivity;
Central and Eastern Europe;
CIS;
TRANSITION ECONOMIES;
PROPERTY-RIGHTS;
GROWTH;
INSTITUTIONS;
PERFORMANCE;
ALLOCATION;
OWNERSHIP;
QUALITY;
FINANCE;
TALENT;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Using enterprise data for the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, this study examines the effects of corruption on productivity. Corruption is narrowly defined as the occurrence of informal payments to government officials to ease the day-to-day operation of firms. The effects of this "bribe tax" on productivity are compared to the consequences of red tape, which may be understood as imposing a "time tax" on firms. When testing effects in the full sample, only the bribe tax appears to have a negative impact on firm-level productivity, while the effect of the time tax is insignificant. We also find that the surrounding environment influences the way in which firm behaviour affects firm performance. In particular, in countries where corruption is more prevalent and the legal framework is weaker, bribery is more harmful for firm-level productivity.