Reference and Truth

被引：6
|
作者：
Picollo, Lavinia [1 ]
机构：
[1] UCL, Dept Philosophy, Gordon Sq, London WC1H 0AW, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC | 2020年 / 49卷 / 03期
关键词：
Semantic paradoxes; Disquotation; Reference; Self-reference; Well-foundedness; Formal truth theories; SELF-REFERENCE; YABLO PARADOX;
D O I：
10.1007/s10992-019-09525-9
中图分类号：
B81 [逻辑学（论理学）];
学科分类号：
010104 ; 010105 ;
摘要：
I apply the notions of alethic reference introduced in previous work in the construction of several classical semantic truth theories. Furthermore, I provide proof-theoretic versions of those notions and use them to formulate axiomatic disquotational truth systems over classical logic. Some of these systems are shown to be sound, proof-theoretically strong, and compare well to the most renowned systems in the literature.
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页码：439 / 474
页数：36
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