Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential

被引：12
|
作者：
Kukushkin, Nikolai S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Dorodnicyn Comp Ctr, Moscow 119333, Russia
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2011年 / 40卷 / 02期
基金：
俄罗斯基础研究基金会;
关键词：
Finite improvement property; Weak finite improvement property; Compact-continuous game; Potential game; DYNAMICS;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-010-0261-7
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
If the preferences of the players in a strategic game satisfy certain continuity conditions, then the acyclicity of individual improvements implies the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. Moreover, starting from any strategy profile, an arbitrary neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria can be reached after a finite number of individual improvements.
引用
收藏
页码：387 / 392
页数：6
相关论文
共 50 条
12345