The implications of central bank transparency for uncertainty and disagreement

被引:12
|
作者
Jitmaneeroj, Boonlert [1 ]
Lamla, Michael J. [2 ,3 ]
Wood, Andrew [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Thai Chamber Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand
[2] Univ Essex, Wivenhoe Pk, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
[3] KOF Swiss Econ Inst, Wivenhoe Pk, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
[4] Univ Portsmouth, Portsmouth, Hants, England
关键词
Central bank transparency; Uncertainty; Disagreement; Monetary policy; MONETARY-POLICY; INFLATION-EXPECTATIONS; FORECAST DISAGREEMENT; PANEL-DATA; COMMUNICATION; INDEPENDENCE; INFORMATION; GUIDANCE; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.10.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using survey data from 25 economies we provide evidence that greater transparency surrounding monetary policy reduces uncertainty of interest rates and inflation, primarily by reducing uncertainty that is common to agents rather than disagreement between agents. This suggests that studies that focus on disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty understate the benefits of monetary policy transparency. The adoption of inflation targets and forward guidance are both associated with lower uncertainty, although inflation targets have a stronger impact on reducing uncertainty than forward guidance. Moreover, there are diminishing benefits from ever higher levels of transparency. Taken as a whole, our results support the contention that clarity of communication is as important as the magnitude of transparency. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:222 / 240
页数:19
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