Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A "desensitizer" from uncertainty

被引：0
|
作者：
Munoz-Garcia, Felix [1 ]
Orozco-Aleman, Sandra [2 ]
机构：
[1] Washington State Univ, Sch Econ Sci, Pullman, WA 99164 USA
[2] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 112卷 / 01期
关键词：
First-price auctions; Asymmetrically informed bidders; Risk aversion; Unknown valuations; STANDARD AUCTIONS; RIVALS TYPES; INFORMATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player's bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：38 / 41
页数：4
相关论文
共 50 条
12345