Cash holding is on average more valuable when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Economically, having an overconfident CEO on board is associated with an increase of $0.28 in the value of $1.00 cash holding. The positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash concentrates among firms that are more likely to suffer from the underinvestment problem (i.e., financially constrained firms which exhibit high growth opportunities). In addition, CEO overconfidence affects negatively the value of cash in firms that are financially unconstrained, a finding which is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. The results are robust to various tests and alternative explanations.
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Korea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Technol Management, Daejeon, South KoreaKorea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Technol Management, Daejeon, South Korea
Seo, Dong Wook
Han, Seung Hun
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Korea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Technol Management, Daejeon, South KoreaKorea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Technol Management, Daejeon, South Korea
机构:
Foreign Trade Univ, 15 D5 St,Ward 25,Ho Chi Minh City Campus, Ho Chi Minh City, VietnamForeign Trade Univ, 15 D5 St,Ward 25,Ho Chi Minh City Campus, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Nguyen, Xuan Minh
Nguyen, Thi Tuyet Mai
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Ho Chi Minh Natl Acad Polit, Acad Polit Reg 2, Ho Chi Minh, VietnamForeign Trade Univ, 15 D5 St,Ward 25,Ho Chi Minh City Campus, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam