CEO overconfidence and the value of corporate cash holdings

被引:93
|
作者
Aktas, Nihat [1 ]
Louca, Christodoulos [2 ]
Petmezas, Dimitris [3 ]
机构
[1] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany
[2] Cyprus Univ Technol, Dept Commerce Finance & Shipping, Limassol, Cyprus
[3] Univ Surrey, Surrey Business Sch, Guildford GU2 7XH, Surrey, England
关键词
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; INVESTMENT; GOVERNANCE; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Cash holding is on average more valuable when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Economically, having an overconfident CEO on board is associated with an increase of $0.28 in the value of $1.00 cash holding. The positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash concentrates among firms that are more likely to suffer from the underinvestment problem (i.e., financially constrained firms which exhibit high growth opportunities). In addition, CEO overconfidence affects negatively the value of cash in firms that are financially unconstrained, a finding which is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. The results are robust to various tests and alternative explanations.
引用
收藏
页码:85 / 106
页数:22
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