The Role of Information in Knowledge-How

被引:0
|
作者
Najenson, Jonathan [1 ]
Fresco, Nir [2 ]
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Philosophy, Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Brain & Cognit Sci & Philosophy, Beer Sheva, Israel
来源
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY | 2021年 / 12卷
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
knowledge; information; skill; motor control; automatization; MOTOR VARIABILITY; SKILL; MEMORY;
D O I
10.3389/fpsyg.2021.634968
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge implicated in skill employment and acquisition. Intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is a special type of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is not propositional. We argue that both views face two open challenges. The first challenge pertains to the relationship between informational states and motor variability. The second pertains to the epistemic function of practice that leads to skill (and knowledge-how). The aim of this paper is to suggest a general conceptual framework based on functional information with both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. Our proposal, we argue, avoids the above challenges, and can further the debate on knowledge-how and skill.
引用
收藏
页数:11
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