GAMES THEORY AND THE MARKET WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION

Studying the conflict situations, using the game theory, where more rational agents take action leads to the conclusion that each of them has a particular purpose and being independent regarding selection of the decisions but dependent of the results. The author proposes a study in this work regarding the patterning process of the market structures with imperfect competition by using the games theory. This particular theory suggests solutions for actions taking place among rational individuals by using adequate mathematical patterns with possible applicability in the economic field. In perfectly competitive markets, buyers and sellers are sufficiently large in number to ensure that no single one of them, alone, has the power to determine market price. Equilibrium in a competitive market thus requires the simultaneous compatibility of disparate and often conflicting self-interested plans of a large number of different agents. Perfect competitive occupies one polar extreme on a spectrum of possible market structures from the more on the less competitive. Many markets display a blend of monopoly and competition simultaneously. Firms become more interdependent the smaller the number of firms in the industry, the easier entry, and the closer the substitute goods available to consumers. When firms perceive their interdependence, they have an incentive to take account of their rivals' actions and formulate their own plans strategically. When firms are behaving strategically, one of the first things we need to do is ask ourselves how we should characterize equilibrium in situations like this. On the face of it, one might be tempted to reason as follows: Because firms are aware of their interdependence, and because the actions of one firm may reduce the profits of others. Putting the legality of such collusion aside, there is something tempting in the idea of a collusive equilibrium such as this. From this reason the analysis instrument of games theory making up the new syntax of the market efficiency. The final conclusions of this paper refer to optimal strategies chosen by players, strategies with applicability in patterning different market structures and the equilibrium