Can quality certification lead to stable cartels?

被引：35
|
作者：
Marette, S
Crespi, JM
机构：
[1] INAPG, INRA, UMR Econ Publ, F-75005 Paris, France
[2] Kansas State Univ, Dept Agr Econ, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA
来源：
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2003年 / 23卷 / 01期
关键词：
antitrust; asymmetric information; cartel-formation process; signal;
D O I：
10.1023/B:REIO.0000005595.35570.1a
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection where consumers are imperfectly informed about product quality. Producer collusion may be necessary to signal quality via third-party certification. While examining different cost structures for third- party certification, we show that a stable cartel that provides information about product quality may improve overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce competition.
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页码：43 / 64
页数：22
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