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Good and Bad Equilibria with the Informal Sector
被引：1
|作者：
Dijkstra, Bouwe R.
[1
,2
,3
]
机构：
[1] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[2] Univ Nottingham, GEP, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[3] CESifo, Munich, Germany
来源：
关键词：
TAX EVASION;
CORRUPTION;
PERSISTENCE;
EVOLUTION;
TAXATION;
MODEL;
D O I：
10.1628/jite-2011-0008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine whether an economy can have a bad (small or no formal sector, high taxes) as well as a good (small or no informal sector, low taxes) equilibrium. The government maximizes a combination of instantaneous welfare and the rate of decline of the informal sector. When the instantaneous welfare component only contains formal-sector welfare, multiple equilibria can occur if the elasticity of average to marginal cost for the public good is less than one. More regard for the informal sector leads to a worse equilibrium and to a higher prevalence of multiple equilibria. (JEL: H26, J24)
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页码：668 / 685
页数：18
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