Skill versus reliability in venture capital

被引:4
|
作者
Khanna, Naveen [1 ]
Mathews, Richmond D. [2 ]
机构
[1] Michigan State Univ, Eli Broad Coll Business, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
[2] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
Venture capital; Competition; Skill; Reputation; EFFICIENCY; MARKET; MODEL; INFORMATION; REPUTATION; CONTRACTS; FIRMS; MONEY; PAY; BAD;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.07.007
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study competition for startups among VCs with heterogeneous skill. VCs with established skill face two impediments. First, less established VCs compete aggressively for new startups in order to establish a reputation. Second, startups also value reliability in their VCs, which imposes a higher cost on established VCs because they have better outside options. As a result, startups "over-experiment" by excessively partnering with less established VCs, which crowds out established skill and reduces social welfare. Established VCs are hurt because they need to pay more to attract startups, lose profitable opportunities, and face increased competition from newly established VCs. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:41 / 63
页数:23
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