Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

被引：11
|
作者：
Poulsen, Anders U. [1 ]
Roos, Michael W. M. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
[2] Ruhr Univ Bochum, Fak Wirtschaftswissensch, D-44780 Bochum, Germany
来源：
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 13卷 / 02期
关键词：
Strategic commitment; Commitment; Bargaining; Strategic value of information; Physical timing effects; Endogenous timing; Experiment; OBSERVABILITY; ACQUISITION; LEADERSHIP; DELEGATION; INDUCTION; CONTRACTS; ULTIMATUM; MARKETS; DUOPOLY; GAMES;
D O I：
10.1007/s10683-010-9236-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.
引用
收藏
页码：206 / 225
页数：20
相关论文
共 50 条
12345