Taxation and Dividend Policy: The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts

被引:36
|
作者
Jacob, Martin [1 ]
Michaely, Roni [2 ]
机构
[1] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Burgpl 2, Vallendar, Germany
[2] Cornell Univ, Samuel Curtis Johnson Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
来源
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2017年 / 30卷 / 09期
关键词
TAX CUT; PAYOUT POLICY; PRIVATE FIRMS; LIFE-CYCLE; CORPORATE; REPURCHASES; VALUATION; RESPONSES; MATTER; GROWTH;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhx041
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners' tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially. (JEL G30, G35, H24, H25)
引用
收藏
页码:3176 / 3222
页数:47
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