The Optimal Design of Hotel Staff Incentive Compensation Contract under Turnover Rate

被引：0

作者：

Xiang, Mingyin ^{[1
]}

Li, Li ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Huangshan Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Huangshan, Anhui, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON APPLIED MATHEMATICS, MODELLING AND STATISTICS APPLICATION (AMMSA 2017) | 2017年 / 141卷

关键词：

hotel Industry; the utility function; symmetric information; asymmetric information; turnover rate; salary design;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

In this article, assuming the output of staff can be observed, we construct the principal-agent incentive model between staff and hotel based on utility maximization. The optimal incentive contract including staff turnover rate are respectively constructed under two cases: the staff's effective working time is symmetric information and asymmetric information. Then, it is discussed that how the turnover rate affects the incentive contract and the enthusiasm of staffs.

引用

页码：235 / 239

页数：5

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