Measuring the success of Alternative Development (AD) programs by the number of illicit crop hectares eradicated puts AD in an undesirable competition with aerial fumigation, which can reduce these areas in a much shorter time. Whereas AD can only obtain results over the long term, the political push to demonstrate immediate successful results has led to an imbalance in United States anti-drug aid, which is strongly weighted towards aerial fumigation. Despite the short-term success of aerial spraying, the key question of the political, social, and economic sustainability of the results obtained through the use of forceful eradication remains open. AD policies have suffered from changes in their focus over time. Today they are fixated on the idea that the sole purpose of illicit crops is to finance terrorist groups. This conception of the policy issue results in the use of force - specifically, aerial fumigations using chemicals - as the foundation for decision making. This single criterion, therefore, affects programs that once recognized the social and economic roots of the problem of illicit crops. This paper seeks to examine and question those aspects of the current strategy and to explore alternative strategies of eradication that take into account who makes decisions in this matter and on whose behalf said alternatives establish oversight for the ongoing advancement in drug policy.
