We study disappointment and platform exit among new bidders in an online auction marketplace. In particular, we study a hybrid auction format with a "Buy-It-Now" option, which, when executed, will abruptly end the auction and cancel any standing bids. When this happens, if the formerly leading bidder is new to the platform, then they are 6 percentage points more likely to exit the marketplace for every additional day they spent in the lead. This is rationalized by disappointment-averse bidders with outside options and rational expectations about the likelihood of winning. Our explanation is validated by three ancillary predictions: when expectations are lowered by higher competing bids, there is no effect; sensitivity of exit is declining in prior experience; and, for bidders who do not exit, time in the lead during the first experience predicts a subsequent preference for fixed-price, rather than auction, listings.
机构:
Lanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China
Cornell Univ, Dyson Sch Appl Econ & Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USALanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China
Zhang, Zhenhua
Zhang, Ke
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Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Econ, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R ChinaLanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China
Zhang, Ke
Qian, Jing
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Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Econ, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R ChinaLanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China
Qian, Jing
Chen, Xue-li
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Lithuanian Ctr Social Sci, Inst Econ & Rural Dev, A Vivulskio Str 4A-13, LT-03220 Vilnius, LithuaniaLanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China
Chen, Xue-li
Song, Malin
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Shandong Univ, Inst Blue & Green Dev, Weihai 264200, Peoples R China
Anhui Univ Finance & Econ, Collaborat Innovat Ctr Ecol Econ & Management, Bengbu 233030, Peoples R ChinaLanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China