Is a cause conceptualized as a generative force?: Evidence from a recognition memory paradigm

How do naive observers conceptualize the causes of behavior? We report evidence that people frequently view an antecedent event, feeling, or motivation as a cause to the extent that it is judged to be a relatively powerful force. Participants in three studies read about situations in which two mental antecedents (e.g., two different attitudes, motivations, or feelings) were consistently associated with the target behavior. One of these antecedents was always described as more typical of the target figure. In one version, for example, Jean's mistakes on the job were said to be consistently accompanied by job-related stress (relatively typical of Jean) and irritation with her coworkers (relatively atypical of her). Study I suggested that an explicit statement about the relative power or intensity of these antecedents influenced causal attributions more than did an explicit statement about their relative covariation with the target behavior. Although the vignettes in studies 2 and 3 contained no information about the power of the antecedents, recognition memory performance indicated that participants inferred that the more typical antecedent was a more powerful force than the atypical antecedent. Analyses also suggest that the tendency to attribute more power to a typical antecedent mediates covariation-inconsistent judgments of causality. In addition, studies 2 and 3 demonstrate the utility of a recognition memory task for identifying implicit inferences. (C) 2001 Academic Press.