Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers

被引：5
|
作者：
Kirkegaard, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] Brock Univ, Dept Econ, St Catharines, ON L2S 3A1, Canada
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 89卷 / 03期
关键词：
reserve prices; participation fees; collusion;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.06.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In English auctions with weak and strong buyers, the equilibrium revenue arising from using the optimal reserve price is shown to be higher than the expected revenue in any "intuitive" equilibrium of an auction with a participation fee. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：328 / 332
页数：5
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