Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts

被引：0
|
作者：
Park, Sung-Hoon [1 ]
Settle, Chad E. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Chosun Univ, Dept Econ, 309 Philmoondaero, Gwangju 61452, South Korea
[2] Univ Tulsa, Dept Econ, 800 S Tucker Dr, Tulsa, OK 74104 USA
来源：
GAMES | 2023年 / 14卷 / 04期
关键词：
asymmetric reimbursement; contingent fee; inefficiency; fairness; Tullock-type contests; unobservable and observable contracts; INFORMATION; DELEGATION;
D O I：
10.3390/g14040055
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff's probability of winning the contest.
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页数：10
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