Effect of marine reserve establishment on non-cooperative fisheries management

被引:5
|
作者
Takashina, Nao [1 ]
Lee, Joung-Hun [2 ]
Possingham, Hugh P. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ryukyus, Trop Biosphere Res Ctr, 3422 Sesoko, Motobu, Okinawa 9050227, Japan
[2] Kyushu Univ, Dept Biol, Nishi Ku, 744 Motooka, Fukuoka 8190395, Japan
[3] Univ Queensland, Sch Biol Sci, ARC Ctr Excellence Environm Decis, St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia
[4] Nature Conservancy, 4245 North Fairfax Dr Suite 100, Arlington, VA 22203 USA
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
Fishery management; Marine protected areas; Non-cooperative resource management; PROTECTED AREAS; SUSTAINABILITY; CONSERVATION; PUNISHMENT; ILLEGAL; COOPERATION; SUBSIDIES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2017.07.004
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
Introducing effective marine reserves is a critical issue in fisheries management and marine ecosystem conservation. In recent years, a number of marine reserves or no-take marine protected areas (MPAs) have been implemented worldwide, and some MPAs have shown ecological and economic benefits. However, consideration for coordinated competition between institutions, a central for successful resource management, is often omitted in research on effective MPA management. Given increasing discussions on implementing MPAs in the high seas, where international fisheries often exemplify the tragedy of the commons, understanding potential competition between institutions can affect MPA management. With this in mind, we aimed to gain generic insight into non-cooperative fisheries management with MPAs. Specifically, we explored the effect of MPA establishment on (1) competition strength between fishery institutions, (2) fish population abundance resulting from the competition, and (3) distribution of the gross fishery profit between institutions. To approach these questions, we developed a minimal model that accounts a non-cooperative behavior of fishery institutions and population dynamics under the MPAs management. We demonstrate that, given a small price-to-cost ratio, a prominent increase in fishery competition could occur as a result of introducing an MPA, leading to reductions in fisheries profits and fish population abundance, and greater unevenness in distribution of the gross fishery profit. Intensified fishery competition was typically observed in the case where the rate of population exchange between the fishing grounds and the MPA is not large, and the fraction of the MPA is intermediate, suggesting that regulation agreements will be required to coordinate the competitive harvesting. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:336 / 342
页数:7
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