asymptotic stochastic stability;
evolutionarily stable strategy;
invariant measure;
Lyapunov function;
Nash equilibrium;
recurrence;
stochastic differential equation;
war of attrition;
D O I:
10.1214/105051604000000837
中图分类号:
O21 [概率论与数理统计];
C8 [统计学];
学科分类号:
020208 ;
070103 ;
0714 ;
摘要:
Fudenberg and Harris' stochastic version of the classical replicator dynamics is considered. The behavior of this diffusion process in the presence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is investigated. Moreover, extinction of dominated strategies and stochastic stability of strict Nash equilibria are studied. The general results are illustrated in connection with a discrete war of attrition. A persistence result for the maximum effort strategy is obtained and an explicit expression for the evolutionarily stable strategy is derived.
机构:
Univ Oxford, Oxford Martin Sch, Inst New Econ Thinking, Oxford, England
Univ Oxford, Smith Sch Enterprise & Environm, Oxford, England
Univ Oxford, Oxford Martin Sch Programme Technol & Econ Change, Oxford, EnglandUniv Oxford, Oxford Martin Sch, Inst New Econ Thinking, Oxford, England
Lafond, Francois
Kim, Daniel
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h-index: 0
机构:
Korea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Nat Sci Res Inst, Daejeon, South KoreaUniv Oxford, Oxford Martin Sch, Inst New Econ Thinking, Oxford, England