Tying contracts and asymmetric information

被引：0
|
作者：
Kamecke, U [1 ]
机构：
[1] Humboldt Univ, Inst Offentliche Wirtschaft & Wirtschaftspolit, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 1998年 / 154卷 / 03期
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D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential. This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product. The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements, the German Meto case and the US American SCM case. (JEL: L 15, L 42).
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页码：531 / 545
页数：15
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