Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months

被引：56
|
作者：
Edmans, Alex [1 ,2 ]
Goncalves-Pinto, Luis [3 ]
Groen-Xu, Moqi [4 ]
Wang, Yanbo [5 ]
机构：
[1] CEPR, London, England
[2] ECGI, London, England
[3] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] London Sch Econ, London, England
[5] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Seoul, South Korea
来源：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2018年 / 31卷 / 11期
基金：
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词：
STOCK OPTION AWARDS; CEO; PERFORMANCE; LIQUIDITY;
D O I：
10.1093/rfs/hhy070
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior and thus unlikely to be driven by the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor nondiscretionary news. News releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting months generates a temporary increase in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly afterwards.
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页码：4099 / 4141
页数：43
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