Winner-pay contests

被引：13
|
作者：
Yates, Andrew J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Richmond, Dept Econ, E Claiborne Robins Sch Business, Richmond, VA 23173 USA
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2011年 / 147卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
Contests; Winner-pay; Equilibrium; Existence; RENT-SEEKING;
D O I：
10.1007/s11127-010-9605-x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze winner-pay contests in which players select bids, the winner is determined probabilistically through a contest success function, and only the winner must pay her bid. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under weak assumptions on the contest success function. We determine the Nash equilibrium for several examples. We also consider how equilibrium bids are influenced by private information about the value of winning the contest.
引用
收藏
页码：93 / 106
页数：14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests
    Fu, Qiang
    Lu, Jingfeng
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2009, 66 (01) : 146 - 161
  • [22] Multi-Winner Contests for Strategic Diffusion in Social Networks
    Shen, Wen
    Feng, Yang
    Lopes, Cristina V.
    THIRTY-THIRD AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTY-FIRST INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE / NINTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2019, : 6154 - 6162
  • [23] And the first runner-up is ... : comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests ...
    Chowdhury, Subhasish M.
    Mukherjee, Anwesha
    Turocy, Theodore L.
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2022,
  • [24] Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
    Xiao, Jun
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2016, 163 : 178 - 221
  • [25] Optimal Prizes for All-Pay Contests in Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing
    Luo, Tie
    Kanhere, Salil S.
    Das, Sajal K.
    Tan, Hwee-Pink
    2014 IEEE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MOBILE AD HOC AND SENSOR SYSTEMS (MASS), 2014, : 136 - 144
  • [26] Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
    Feng, Xin
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2023, 52 (02) : 401 - 421
  • [27] Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
    Xin Feng
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, 52 : 401 - 421
  • [28] Picking the Right Winner: Why Tie-Breaking in Crowdsourcing Contests Matters
    Haggiag, Coral
    Oren, Sigal
    Segev, Ella
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IJCAI 2022, 2022, : 307 - 313
  • [29] Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
    Ewerhart, Christian
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2017, 105 : 195 - 211
  • [30] Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests
    Franke, Joerg
    Leininger, Wolfgang
    Wasser, Cedric
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2018, 104 : 22 - 37
12345