Winner-pay contests

被引：13
|
作者：
Yates, Andrew J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Richmond, Dept Econ, E Claiborne Robins Sch Business, Richmond, VA 23173 USA
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2011年 / 147卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
Contests; Winner-pay; Equilibrium; Existence; RENT-SEEKING;
D O I：
10.1007/s11127-010-9605-x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze winner-pay contests in which players select bids, the winner is determined probabilistically through a contest success function, and only the winner must pay her bid. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under weak assumptions on the contest success function. We determine the Nash equilibrium for several examples. We also consider how equilibrium bids are influenced by private information about the value of winning the contest.
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页码：93 / 106
页数：14
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