The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets

被引:57
|
作者
Boubakri, Narjess [2 ]
Cosset, Jean-Claude [3 ]
Guedhami, Omrane [1 ,4 ]
Saffar, Walid [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ S Carolina, Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC 29223 USA
[2] Amer Univ Sharjah, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates
[3] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[4] Mem Univ Newfoundland, St John, NF A1B 3X5, Canada
[5] Amer Univ Beirut, Olayan Sch Business, Beirut 11072020, Lebanon
关键词
Privatization; Control structure; Political institutions; Performance; Emerging markets; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; BANK PRIVATIZATION; PRIVATISATION; TRANSITION; DECISION; CHOICE; REFORM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.08.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions in place, namely, the political system and political constraints, are important determinants of residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. Unlike previous evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of privatization policies in developed countries, we find that right- or left-oriented governments do not behave differently in developing countries. These results confirm that privatization is politically constrained by dynamics that differ between countries. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:244 / 258
页数:15
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