Investment Strategies for Sourcing a New Technology in the Presence of a Mature Technology

被引:15
|
作者
Zhang, Wei [1 ]
Lee, Hsiao-Hui [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business & Econ, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Chengchi Univ, Dept Management Informat Syst, Taipei 11605, Taiwan
关键词
new technology adoption; collaborative R&D; supply chain financing; CAPACITY INVESTMENT; LIMITED-LIABILITY; TRADE CREDIT; INVENTORY; UNCERTAINTY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2021.4078
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
To stay competitive, high-technology manufacturers not only frequently source new technologies from their suppliers, but also financially support the development of these new technologies into component products or production tools. We consider a manufacturer that can either source a new but immature technology from a financially constrained supplier, or source a mature technology from an existing supplier if and only if the development of the new technology fails. To support the new technology, the manufacturer can choose to inject capital in the form of an equity or loan. The investment strategy not only affects the new supplier's development effort and the probability of technical success (PTS), but also affects the existing supplier's effort to improve the mature technology, which presents the manufacturer with a trade-off. Following the debt financing literature, we find that a loan contract is associated with a cost-shifting effect and often leads to a higher PTS. However, because the manufacturer not only maintains an investment but also a procurement relationship with the new supplier, we find a profit-sharing effect associated with an equity investment, which does not exist in the traditional equity issuance literature. In particular, we show that the profit-sharing effect can dominate the cost-shifting effect and lead to a higher PTS when the new supplier's technological capability is sufficiently high. Nonetheless, we also show that the strategy that derives a higher PTS does not necessarily generate a higher payoff for the manufacturer. On the one hand, a loan can be preferred even when it leads to a lower PTS because the cost-shifting effect allows the manufacturer to offer a sufficiently low procurement payment while maintaining a sufficiently high PTS. On the other hand, when the existing supplier is very capable of reducing its costs, a loan can over-incentivize the new supplier to exert excessive effort and backfire.
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页码:4631 / 4644
页数:15
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