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The hazards of moral hazard: Comment on Goff, Shughart, and Tollison
被引:4
|作者:
Levitt, SD
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ Chicago, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词:
D O I:
10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01746.x
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Goff et al. [1997] argue that the sharp increase in the number of hit batsmen after the adoption of the designated hitter rule is due to moral hazard. I argue instead that simple changes in the composition of batters faced explains much of the observed effect. Pitchers are bad hitters and therefore are much less likely to be hit than their designated hitters. Furthermore, there is no correlation between the frequency with which individual pitchers hit opposing batsmen and their personal likelihood of being hit by a pitch while batting, contrary to the predictions of the moral hazard model. (JEL D81, J28).
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页码:685 / 687
页数:3
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