Rational nonprofit entrepreneurship

被引：9
|
作者：
Bilodeau, M [1 ]
Slivinski, A
机构：
[1] Indiana Univ Purdue Univ, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA
[2] Univ Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, PQ J1K 2R1, Canada
[3] Univ Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1998年 / 7卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1162/105864098567515
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.
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页码：551 / 571
页数：21
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