Incentive Mechanism Design for Distributed Coded Machine Learning

被引:7
|
作者
Ding, Ningning [1 ]
Fang, Zhixuan [2 ,3 ]
Duan, Lingjie [4 ,5 ]
Huang, Jianwei [5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Informat Engn, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Tsinghua Univ, Inst Interdisciplinary Informat Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Shanghai Qi Zhi Inst, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[4] Singapore Univ Technol & Design, Engn Syst & Design Pillar, Singapore, Singapore
[5] Shenzhen Inst Artificial Intelligence & Robot Soc, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[6] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Sci & Engn, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
关键词
distributed machine learning; coded computation; costs and incentives of workers; incomplete information;
D O I
10.1109/INFOCOM42981.2021.9488672
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
A distributed machine learning platform needs to recruit many heterogeneous worker nodes to finish computation simultaneously. As a result, the overall performance may be degraded due to straggling workers. By introducing redundancy into computation, coded machine learning can effectively improve the runtime performance by recovering the final computation result through the first k (out of the total n) workers who finish computation. While existing studies focus on designing efficient coding schemes, the issue of designing proper incentives to encourage worker participation is still under-explored. This paper studies the platform's optimal incentive mechanism for motivating proper workers' participation in coded machine learning, despite the incomplete information about heterogeneous workers' computation performances and costs. A key contribution of this work is to summarize workers' multi-dimensional heterogeneity as a one-dimensional metric, which guides the platform's efficient selection of workers under incomplete information with a linear computation complexity. Moreover, we prove that the optimal recovery threshold k is linearly proportional to the participator number n if we use the widely adopted MDS codes for data encoding. We also show that the platform's increased cost due to incomplete information disappears when worker number is sufficiently large, but it does not monotonically decrease in worker number.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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