Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement

被引:15
|
作者
Stefanescu, Irina [1 ]
Wang, Yupeng [2 ]
Xie, Kangzhen [3 ]
Yang, Jun [4 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Syst, Board Governors, 20th St & Constitut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20551 USA
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, 100 Main St,Bldg E62, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[3] Seton Hall Univ, Stillman Sch Business, 400 South Orange Ave, S Orange, NJ 07079 USA
[4] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, 1309 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
关键词
Corporate governance; Executive annual bonuses; Defined benefit pension plans; Pension freezes; Executive retirement; CEO PAY; HORIZON PROBLEM; INCENTIVES; MARKET; COMPENSATION; FIRMS; PERFORMANCE; INVESTMENT; ECONOMICS; EXPLAIN;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.10.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Large US firms modify top executives' compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:152 / 173
页数:22
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