The adoption of poison pills and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from Japan

被引：5
|
作者：
Arikawa, Yasuhiro [1 ]
Mitsusada, Yosuke [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Finance Accounting & Law, Chuo Ku, Tokyo 1030027, Japan
[2] SANNO Univ, Sch Management, Setagaya Ku, Tokyo 1588630, Japan
[3] Asuka Asset Management Ltd, Setagaya Ku, Tokyo 1588630, Japan
来源：
JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY | 2011年 / 23卷 / 01期
关键词：
Poison pill; Takeover defense;
D O I：
10.1016/j.japwor.2010.11.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Using Japanese cases, this paper presents evidence that the adoption of poison pills reveals private information about preferences for managerial entrenchment to the stock market. We find that this private information revelation effect is the reason for the stock price decline with the announcement of poison pill defenses. The stock market considers the adoption of a poison pill to be a signal that the manager wishes to entrench him/herself. We also find that a CEO with longer tenure is more likely to adopt a poison pill when the performance of the firm is poor. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：63 / 77
页数：15
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