The adoption of poison pills and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from Japan

被引：5
|
作者：
Arikawa, Yasuhiro [1 ]
Mitsusada, Yosuke [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Finance Accounting & Law, Chuo Ku, Tokyo 1030027, Japan
[2] SANNO Univ, Sch Management, Setagaya Ku, Tokyo 1588630, Japan
[3] Asuka Asset Management Ltd, Setagaya Ku, Tokyo 1588630, Japan
来源：
JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY | 2011年 / 23卷 / 01期
关键词：
Poison pill; Takeover defense;
D O I：
10.1016/j.japwor.2010.11.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Using Japanese cases, this paper presents evidence that the adoption of poison pills reveals private information about preferences for managerial entrenchment to the stock market. We find that this private information revelation effect is the reason for the stock price decline with the announcement of poison pill defenses. The stock market considers the adoption of a poison pill to be a signal that the manager wishes to entrench him/herself. We also find that a CEO with longer tenure is more likely to adopt a poison pill when the performance of the firm is poor. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：63 / 77
页数：15
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Managerial entrenchment and corporate bond financing: evidence from Japan
    Tanaka, Takanori
    APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2010, 17 (16) : 1571 - 1574
  • [2] Stock price crash risk and the adoption of poison pills: evidence from Brazil
    Paiva Azevedo, Yuri Gomes
    Diniz Schwarz, Lucas Allan
    Gomes, Hellen Bomfim
    Ambrozini, Marcelo Augusto
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2023, 19 (03) : 691 - 711
  • [3] Managerial Entrenchment and Antitakeover Provisions in Japan
    Hosono, Kaoru
    Takizawa, Miho
    Tsuru, Kotaro
    SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2011, 24 (03) : 287 - 331
  • [4] OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND THE ADOPTION OF POISON PILLS
    BRICKLEY, JA
    COLES, JL
    TERRY, RL
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1994, 35 (03) : 371 - 390
  • [5] Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure: New Evidence
    John, Kose
    Litov, Lubomir
    JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 2010, 7 (04) : 693 - 742
  • [6] Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control
    Bates, Thomas W.
    Becher, David A.
    Lemmon, Michael L.
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 87 (03) : 656 - 677
  • [7] Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Moroccan Listed Companies
    Mohamed, Bousetta
    CENTRAL EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2021, 29 (03) : 40 - 62
  • [8] Corporate culture, staggered boards, and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from textual analysis
    Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn
    Wongboonsin, Kua
    Ongsakul, Viput
    Jiraporn, Pornsit
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2024, 93 : 404 - 418
  • [9] EFFECTS OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND STOCK OWNERSHIP ON THE ADOPTION OF POISON PILLS
    MALLETTE, P
    FOWLER, KL
    ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1992, 35 (05): : 1010 - 1035
  • [10] Governance provisions and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from CEO turnover of acquiring firms
    Sokolyk T.
    Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2015, 45 (2) : 305 - 335
12345