Relative pay and its effects on firm efficiency in a transitional economy

被引：21
|
作者：
Firth, Michael [1 ]
Leung, Tak Yan [2 ]
Rui, Oliver M. [3 ]
Na, Chaohong [4 ]
机构：
[1] Lingnan Univ, Dept Finance & Insurance, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Open Univ Hong Kong, Lee Shau Kee Sch Business & Adm, Homantin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] CEIBS, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[4] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business, Kunming, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2015年 / 110卷
关键词：
Productivity; Top management pay; Relative pay; Transitional economy; RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; CEO COMPENSATION; WAGE DISPERSION; EXECUTIVE PAY; PERFORMANCE; SATISFACTION; OWNERSHIP; CHINA; PRODUCTIVITY; INCENTIVES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this study, we examine the impact of relative pay (manager pay divided by average worker pay) on a firm's productivity. Using data from a major transitional economy, China, we find that relative pay is negatively associated with high productivity. Our results provide support for the view that workers are alienated when their incomes are far lower than that of top management and this leads to lower productivity. This effect is most pronounced in labor intensive firms. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：59 / 77
页数：19
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