Managing competition on a two-sided platform

被引：68
|
作者：
Belleflamme, Paul [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Peitz, Martin [5 ,6 ,7 ]
机构：
[1] Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, EHESS, Cent Marseille,AMSE, Aix En Provence, France
[2] Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, EHESS, Cent Marseille,AMSE, Marseille, France
[3] KEDGE Business Sch, Talence, France
[4] CESifo, Munich, Germany
[5] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
[6] Univ Mannheim, MaCCI, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
[7] CEPR CESifo & ZEW, Munich, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2019年 / 28卷 / 01期
关键词：
Imperfect competition; intermediation; network effects; platform competition; pricing; two-sided markets; CONSUMER SEARCH; DIFFERENTIATION; INTERMEDIATION; EXTERNALITIES; COORDINATION; ECONOMICS; INTERNET; CHOICE; MARKET; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1111/jems.12311
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
On many two-sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.
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页码：5 / 22
页数：18
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