A political economic analysis of Congressional voting patterns on NAFTA

This paper delves into the question of the determinants of Congressional voting on NAFTA. It uses a legit model to examine both House and Senate votes and is able to use district specific estimates in the former. It finds only very limited support for the thesis that narrowly defined employment gainers and losers were important determinants of Congressional voting patterns, though some substantial support that districts that were highly agricultural or already possessed a substantial Hispanic population and skilled labor force and had the most to gain from the general effects of NAFTA lead to a positive effect on the probability that a member of the House would vote affirmatively. Contributions from labor unions lowered the likelihood of affirmative votes. Political partisanship and ideological positions apparently had Little effect on the votes. A Representative's political capital had a marginally significant effect on the probability of an affirmative vote, but it performed positively in the Senate and negatively in the House.