Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition

被引：1
|
作者：
Yildirim, Mustafa [1 ]
机构：
[1] Izmir Katip Celebi Univ, Dept Econ, Balatcik Kampusu Cigli, TR-35620 Izmir, Turkey
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2019年 / 177卷
关键词：
Legislative bargaining; Voting rule; Rent-seeking; Team size; MAJORITY-RULE; POWER;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I investigate team formation in a legislative bargaining model in which both the surplus and recognition are endogenous. I find that the optimal team size increases with stricter agreement rules and longer sighted agents but remains too small from the social perspective. Moreover, the optimal size may not exhaust increasing returns to scale. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：81 / 84
页数：4
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