Optimal incentive contract on human capital investment under imperfect information

被引：0
|
作者：
Tian Ying [1 ]
Pan Xiaolin [1 ]
机构：
[1] Chongqing Normal Univ, Coll Math & Comp Sci, Chongqing 400047, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING - MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES SECTION | 2007年
关键词：
human capital investment; incentive; optimal contract; imperfect information;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper, a model of employer-employee contractions that include the possibility of human capital investment and an endogenous labor market in a multi period environment has been built. The structure of the optimal decision and the effects of various parameters on the optimal decisions were derived. The results of this paper show that the optimal incentive contracts will have different requirements and a payoff, depending on the agent's initial skill level, and the labor market is the driving force in the agent's human capital investment decision.
引用
收藏
页码：685 / 690
页数：6
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