Competitive location and pricing on a line with metric transportation costs

被引:16
|
作者
Arbib, Claudio [1 ]
Pinar, Mustafa C. [2 ]
Tonelli, Matteo [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Aquila, Dipartimento Sci Ingn Informaz & Matemat, Via Vetoio, I-67010 Laquila, Italy
[2] Bilkent Univ, Dept Ind Engn, Ankara, Turkey
[3] Gran Sasso Sci Inst, Via Francesco Crispi 7, I-67100 Laquila, Italy
关键词
Pricing; Location; Sequential games; Multi-level programming; Computational complexity; MODEL; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.08.042
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Consider a three-level non-capacitated location/pricing problem: a firm first decides which facilities to open, out of a finite set of candidate sites, and sets service prices with the aim of revenue maximization; then a second firm makes the same decisions after checking competing offers; finally, customers make individual decisions trying to minimize costs that include both purchase and transportation. A restricted two-level problem can be defined to model an optimal reaction of the second firm to known decision of the first. For non-metric costs, the two-level problem corresponds to ENVY-FREE PRICING or to a special NETWORK PRICING problem, and is APX-complete even if facilities can be opened at no fixed cost. Our focus is on the metric 1-dimensional case, a model where customers are distributed on a main communication road and transportation cost is proportional to distance. We describe polynomial-time algorithms that solve two- and three-level problems with opening costs and single 1st level facility. Quite surprisingly, however, even the two-level problem with no opening costs becomes NP-hard when two 1st level facilities are considered. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
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页码:188 / 200
页数:13
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